



ISCG, Camp 8, 14/03/2019

Monsoon Response Plan

I. Scenario

The normal monsoon season in Bangladesh, which peaks between June and August, will see 20-25 days of rain, with an average precipitation of between 400-600 mm a month.¹ However, rain fall patterns can be inconsistent and single day totals of over 200 mm have been reported. While inhabited areas Cox's of Bazar have not been historically prone to flooding, the removal of vegetation, extensive hill-cutting and other changes to the landscapes in the refugee camps have dramatically increased the risk of flooding and landslides.² While ongoing mitigation efforts have improved the situation since 2018, serious risks remain.

For 2019 monsoon season planning purposes, the assumption for a moderate weather event is that the following number of families will be affected by incidents of flooding or landslides over the course of the season based on the number of 2018 monsoon moderate incidents (³previously referred to as category or level 1 incidents, June – September 2018) plus additional 25 per cent of the total incidents of each month.

	# of people affected as per 2018 monsoon incidents report	Planning estimates for 2019 monsoon season (2018 figure + 25%)
June	19,691 (appx. 4,376 HHs)	24,613 (5,469 HHs)
July	19,570 (4,349 HHs)	24,463 (5,436 HHs)
August	1,487 (330 HHs)	1,859 (413 HHs)
September	1,201 (267 HHs)	1,501 (334 HHs)
TOTAL	41,949 (9,322 HHs)	52,436 (11,652 HHs)

II. Planning assumptions

- Heavy rains and thunder-storms cause regular small – scale *moderate incidents* (such as landslides, flood, high wind) that cause some injuries and displacement with little or no impact outside the locally affected area.
- Access within camps may become increasingly difficult, with areas temporarily cut off by flooding or landslides and the road from Cox's Bazar may be occasionally blocked.
- Localized communicable disease outbreaks may increase throughout the monsoon season, including acute watery diarrhea (AWD).
- While short-term intense storms will cause incidents and displacements, serious disruptions of the camp are unlikely. However, heavy rains and severe weather that sustain over three or four days may cause cumulative impacts that may outpace capacity to sustain access or repair infrastructure and shelters, becoming *major events*.

III. Overview of emergency response system | Moderate⁴ incidents

For moderate level incidents, the response is expected to be managed at camp level through the Site Management Sector (SMS). For more details please see the SMS Monsoon Preparedness Guidance Checklist.

¹ <https://weather-and-climate.com/average-monthly-Rainfall-Temperature-Sunshine,cox-s-bazar,Bangladesh>

² Note that if the monsoon is below average this may trigger a drought and food security challenges within the host community.

³ Common reported incidents include landslide, wind-storm, flood, water-logging, fire, lighting.

⁴ **Moderate (1):** Weather event that caused localized damage in one or multiple camps that can be responded to with existing coordination structures at camp level.

1. Emergency Coordination Structure – Camp Disaster Management Committee

Each camp should have established a Camp Disaster Management Committee (CDMC) at camp level, including:

- SMS Agency (Camp Manager)
- CiC/Assistant CiCs
- WASH Sector Focal Point
- Shelter Focal Point
- Health Focal Point
- Protection Focal Point
- Child Protection Focal Point
- Food Sector Focal Point
- SMEP FOB Focal Point
- Disaster Management Unit Representative
- CPP

The Disaster Management Committee will be the central decision-making response body for coordination at a camp level during the monsoon season.

During a response to an incident, the SMS Agency should relay all information collected through the incident report/initial assessment to the emergency operational partners focal points and define a response plan to the situation, including:

- Displacement status of the affected population
- Mobilisation of teams for follow up field assessment for displaced families
- Type of assistance to be activated
- Distribution points assigned for assistance (either regular or emergency)
- Delivery modality of assistance (see porter system below)
- Expected timeframe of the initial response

If access is allowed in the camp, the Disaster Management Committee should meet at the CiC office to coordinate operations at a field level of all the teams. Information hubs should be activated to take complaints/issues to ensure that the office is not swamped with people reporting issues.

2. Camp Disaster Management Unit (DMU)

In each camp, disaster preparedness and response capacity will be developed at the community level through volunteer teams. In both IOM & UNHCR Areas of Responsibility, they may have different composition in terms of community groups trained, however will all fulfill the overall mandate and function of the Disaster Management Unit during preparedness and response. The overall purpose of the group(s) is to act as first responders to incidents of emergency in their camps, as well as engage in preparedness activities such as hazard and risk mapping and messaging within the community. They are being linked with national institutions and service providers to be trained on fire safety, cyclone preparedness, search and rescue, first aid and protection. Their roles and responsibilities during an emergency will be clearly mapped out in the Response Protocol for Major & Moderate incidents within the camps.

IOM, UNHCR, and relevant institutions are providing equipment to the volunteers that form the DMUs and ensuring they remain engaged and active in the lead up to and during monsoon season.

The DMUs should consist of 100 volunteers who have complete the following trainings:

- Fire Safety, Search & Rescue & First Aid (FSCD) training

- Cyclone Preparedness Programme (CPP) training
- Protection/PFA training

Other volunteers and teams will also have important roles in supporting emergency activities. These include Health Volunteers and Protection Emergency Response Units (PERU). Coordination and appropriate roles between different volunteers are determined by the SMA and DMC.

3. Incident response system

a) *Initial Assessment & Reporting of Incidents*

In order to receive initial reports shortly after or during hazard incidents at a camp level, a community-based reporting mechanism have been set up in order to establish the type, location and scale of the incident from the community to the SMS agency. At a camp level, the SMS agency has systems to receive initial information on status of damage/impact to households, geo-referenced to the Mahji block population boundaries, or sub-block boundaries if applicable.

After compilation of incident information, it will be communicated immediately to the Camp in Charge (CiC) and the operational partners in the camp (*see Emergency Coordination*) via WhatsApp or other channels as required. This information is only shared for operational purposes.

Validated information is released through the Daily Incident Reporting System. Updates on the number and type of incidents that have occurred is provided for release daily at 8 pm. On days with multiple incidents, preliminary information may be released at 1pm if useful to ensure common operational understanding of the severity of the situation. Incident reports are distributed through the Emergency Incident Mailing List and the Emergency Incident WhatsApp group. See Annex on Communication Protocols for more information.

b) *Distribution*

Post-incident distributions will be done based on needs assessments at household level. Only needed items should be provided to affected families.

There are three types of distribution points that SMS agencies that may use as appropriate.

- Main Sector Distribution Points in operation (primarily for food and shelter) which will be primary distribution points if available
- Container locations
- Back up camp level distribution points

Depending on vulnerability and number of people affected, assistance may be delivered directly to households or through other locations as appropriate.

4. Relocation to Temporary Collective Shelter⁵

Community structures in each camp that are not in a landslide or flood area shall be identified by the SMS agency for use as temporary collective shelters for households temporarily displaced by flooding or landslides.

Due to the temporary nature of most community buildings in the camp and the limited structural integrity (i.e. bamboo and plastic sheeting) these shelters are not safe during a cyclone or tropical storm event.

⁵ Temporary Collective Shelters were previously referred to as "Safe Havens". It is advised that this term is no longer used due to the risk that people will see these as safe in all instances, including cyclones, when they often provide less protection than simply being in the camp.

However, a considerable number of facilities have been upgraded to withstand heavier winds, and if displacement occurs due to flooding and landslide, they can provide an option for temporary shelter after the event until the household can be allowed back in or relocated to a new plot. This is also a potential option for temporary relocation before a heavy rain for those that live in landslide or flood prone areas.

Selection of community structures should be made in advance where possible by the site management supporting agency in consultation with the CiC, humanitarian agencies and with the community representatives.

At Camp level additional facilities available to be used as Temporary Collective Shelters have been identified and may include mosques and humanitarian facilities upgraded by IOM and UNHCR and other partners, as well as other services such as Child Friendly Spaces and Women’s Friendly Spaces, offices, Learning Centres, etc.

Specific exclusions from use as temporary shelter are:

- *Designated Lost Child and Caregiver reunification points* run by the Child Protection partners. Some facilities may be designated specifically for women, men, children or other groups as determined by SMS at Camp-level.
- *Health clinics* should not be considered as Temporary Collective Shelters post incident, due to their need to continue critical life-saving services.

The key message is that only if people are displaced by flooding or landslides in those blocks, or pre-emptively told to evacuate, should people congregate at the pre-identified temporary collective shelters and thereafter await assistance / further instruction. Households in high-risk landslide or flood locations are encouraged to have an emergency self-relocation plan during heavy rainfall to stay with a relative or neighbor or a Temporary Collective Shelter in a safer area before damage to their shelter occurs. SMS agencies, along with the DMUs, should support the households during this relocation. As noted above, households should not go to these facilities to seek shelter from a cyclone.

B. Monsoon Response Plan | Major⁶ event

While flooding and landslides are likely to be randomly distributed across the season, there is the possibility of a more catastrophic event that primarily impacts on the camps. This is most likely to be the cumulative effect of a long period of intense rains that overstretch the abilities to repair infrastructure or respond to specific incidents. Depending on the nature of the event, there may be a few days warning from short-term weather forecasting, but it is not likely to be totally predictable. A high level of readiness will need to be maintained from June to August at a minimum.

While unlikely due to the high level of resilience to flooding, there is also the possibility of a disruptive events in the host community or other areas of Ukhiya and Teknaf, while the camps are not severely affected. In these instances, the priority would be on ensuring effective coordination with local government to ensure that any requests for support are addressed in an appropriate manner. If both the Camps and Bangladeshi community are severely affected, the Extreme Disaster Plan (72-hour plan) would go into effect.

⁶ **Major (2)**: Weather event that causes incidents across multiple camps that requires area/sector level coordination for prioritization of response/resources. Previously known as a category 2 response.

A Major (previously level 2) incident is defined for planning purposes as a weather event that causes incidents (flooding/landslide) across multiple camps, seriously disrupting normal operations and requiring area/sector level coordination for prioritization of response/resources.

Activation check-list

Activation of the Major Disaster Plan is done by the Senior Coordinator following consultation with the HoSOG.

The Senior Coordinator will consider the following factors when deciding whether activation is required. Due to the complexity and variety of potential scenario, disruptions no specific thresholds are set.

- Enough shelters or facilities are damaged across a sufficient number of camps, that the Camp DMCs can no longer effectively respond without additional assistance or that assistance is substantially displaced.
- Numbers of people displaced or in Temporary Collective Shelters are increasing faster than people can be relocated; people are staying in the Shelters for longer than 72 hours.
- Access to the camp becomes seriously restricted, either because damage within the camp is happening faster than it can be repaired, or because of damage/disruption to the main access roads from Cox's Bazar.
- There are a high number of injuries or fatalities straining the normal health and dead body management systems.
- Substantial numbers of people are displaced outside of their Camp or into host community/logistical staging areas (e.g. Rubber Garden, SMEP) adjacent to the Camp requiring the establishment of additional services or temporary camp areas.
- Severe impact of weather event is compounded by other type of ongoing emergency – health response (AWD or other major outbreak) or other security complications that make regular operations more difficult.

Any other factors that would require stronger centralized coordination for a short period of time.

I. Humanitarian Coordination Cell (HCC) activation / de-activation

Upon Activation of the Major Disaster Plan, the Humanitarian Coordination Cell (HCC) for *operational response coordination in the camps* will be set up, at Cox's Bazar and Upazila levels (depending on the situation). Strategic coordination and decision making will remain with HoSO and Senior Coordinator.

The Senior Coordinator will recommend whether HCCs are required at Cox's Level only or whether HCCs need to be activated at Upazila level, in consultation with HoSO.

Cox-level Ops HCC (co-lead RRRC-IOM-UNHCR)

The Cox level HCC will be composed from Sector or agencies operational representatives. It will consist of the following agencies/coordinators:

- RRRC appointed representative
- HCR, WFP, UNICEF and IOM Emergency Coordinators
- Health sector representative (to do the liaison with Health District EOC based at Civil Surgeon's office in Cox's Bazar)
- Shelter, WASH, Food Security, SMSD, Logistics Sector, Protection Sector (including CP and GBV) Coordinators and other Sectors/working groups as required (such as CWC)
- Red Cross representative
- Information management support

- ISCG

Upazila-level Ops HCC (co-lead RRRC-IOM-UNHCR)

It will consist of the following agencies/coordinators:

- RRRC appointed representative
- UNHCR & IOM Field/Area Coordinator
- UNHCR/IOM Shelter distribution Coordinators
- Mobile Medical Team (MMT) Coordinator
- All Sectors as per the needs and relevance
- Information management support
- IOM/UNHCR/UNICEF WASH Coordinators
- WFP Upazila Field Coordinators
- ISCG

Co-chairs of the HCC in Ukhiya and Teknaf will be RRRC representative Area Coordinator and UNHCR Field Coordinators. The ISCG will liaise with DC/UNOs and Government DMCs as needed.

De-activation

The normal operation in the camp level will be resumed as soon as conditions allow, based on the recommendation of HCC. In general, the duration of Major Response Plan activation is anticipated to be no more than 3-5 days.

Upon deactivation, the HCC should clearly indicate the indicators that it used to decide on deactivation. A Major Incident Report should be issued within 24 hours of the deactivation providing an overview of the response.

II. Response Plan

1. Coordination

Based on the criteria illustrated in previous section, the HCC will be activated at Cox's Bazar level and Upazila level as appropriate. The members of HCC are responsible for making sure the information is flowing up and down and will coordinate with partners (including national and international NGOs) to evaluate their capacity to respond to an event should the HCC be activated.

Flowing up in this case means the information will be shared to ISCG, HOSOG, Sector Coordinators, and SEG, whereas flowing downs means information will be shared to the actors who are responsible for the response on the ground.

The coordination mechanism establishes the HCC as a dedicated structure for the operational coordination of emergency response in the camps (at both Cox and Upazila level) under RRRC leadership, with a strong liaison component to local Government structure.

For Major Emergencies it is unlikely that Government Emergency Operations Centres would be activated, but ongoing engagement with either DC/UNO or with the Disaster Management Committees at the appropriate level would be required. ISCG will provide a liaison function.

Strategic/political level coordination remains with the HoSO forum and the Senior Coordinator. The HCC focuses on operational level emergency response coordination in the camps only.

It is proposed that the RRRC office appoint for each level of HCC (Cox, Teknaf Upazila and Ukhia Upazila) one dedicated RRRC representative that will lead each HCC with IOM and UNHCR.

The locations identified for the organization of the Humanitarian Coordination Cells are as per below table:

HCC Level	Proposed location	Alternate #1
Cox's level Ops HCC	UNHCR meeting room	IOM conference room
Ukhia level Ops HCC	Madhuchara hub	ISCG Hub Ukhia
Teknaf level Ops HCC	IOM Teknaf office Conference room	UNO office Teknaf

IOM, UNHCR and the ISCG will operationalize the rooms with required/adequate equipment.

Specific roles and responsibilities for HCCs are detailed below to ensure efficient information sharing, reporting and decision-making. A key principle is the decentralization of decision-making to the field to avoid delays of life-saving decisions.

Due to the variety of situations that may generate a Major Emergency, the Senior Coordinator in consultation with the HoSO should clearly define the scope of the HCC's focus and role. For example, the HCC may be formed purely to address distribution and access issues, etc. This should be formally communicated.

Level	Roles & responsibilities	Decision-making	Information flow UPWARDS	Information flow DOWNWARDS	Link with EOC / Coord. Mechanism
COX'S BAZAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Movement of stock from out of camp warehouse to the camps ➤ Security exemption ➤ Advise on political coordination as appropriate (issues arising related to host community response notably, for ISCG/HoSO) ➤ External reporting (communicate to ISCG) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Call on additional pipeline (Chittagong, international ...) ➤ Staff evacuation. ➤ Call on national / international resources ➤ Additional coverage of HC needs (beyond Teknaf / Ukhia) 	<p>OUT of BANGLADESH:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Reporting on damages, casualties and needs ➤ Reporting on response (distribution, etc.) ➤ Access & security ➤ HC response ➤ Government communication/orders on military engagement/s support in crisis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Incoming stock ➤ Weather forecast update ➤ Security Update 	<p>Liaison with</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Cox's Bazar EOC
UPAZILA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Compile assessment data to establish heat map ➤ Stock management (if area needs additional stock from initial stock prepositioned) ➤ Resource management (mobilizing additional staff, vehicles etc.) beyond initial set-up ➤ Coordination of all actors involved in the response ➤ Reporting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Based on result of assessment, decide distribution methodologies (as per agreed SOP) ➤ Resource reallocation & stock sharing amongst agencies ➤ Prioritization of SMEP/earthworks/access works in camps and army and police forces will work on access and traffic control outside of camps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Upazila -level data / results from needs / damage assessment ➤ Upazila -level access constraints ➤ Upazila -level ongoing response (distribution, mobile teams) ➤ Periodic reporting (2-3-hour windows?) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Incoming stock ➤ Weather forecast update ➤ Security Update ➤ Distribution decisions, resource reallocations 	<p>Liaison with</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Ukhia & Teknaf EOC ➤ Camp/Union field teams

2. Communication and Access

In terms of access, several stakeholders will have key role in assessing and re-establishing access to affected communities (both host and refugee communities) and supplies road.

Stakeholders	Access related activities (immediate response after HCC activation for a major emergency)
Logistics Sector / WFP	The online access constraints map is updated on a rolling basis with input from the military, the humanitarian community.
Logistics Sector / WFP	Logistics Sector performs rapid assessments to confirm flow in core corridors from Cox's Bazar to the camps. The results are used to update the access constraint map and shared with relevant actors, such as the Site Engineering Management Project (SMEP) and military engineers to assess possible works to remove road blockages.
Army/police	Military has confirmed capacity to conduct distributions, road & debris clearing and access control from CXB to camps but decisions will be made according to chain of command and situation on the ground, so no assumptions can be made until situation evolves.
SMEP	SMEP ⁷ has identified the following roles based on its mandate during an emergency to ensure movements of people and support mechanisms in the camp: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Access <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Debris clearance ○ Drainage repair/ clearance ○ Road repair/ temp road construction ○ Bridges/ culvert repairing and temp construction ○ Slope stabilization ➤ Ensure access to the key institutions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Hospitals ○ Distribution points, ○ Triage/Medical Staging areas? ○ Safe facilities ➤ Provide support to Mobile clinics in our FOBs and ensure their access to the respective locations

3. Stocks and Pre-positioning

Within the camps, emergency items for humanitarian response have been pre-positioned by key agencies (IOM, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, etc.) in and around the camps. Prepositioning and stock monitoring will be done by responsible Sectors/agencies.

4. Distributions of Shelter / NFI, WASH and Food

Post-incident distributions will be done based on needs assessments. The HCC will need to analyze the situation and determine if any modifications to the Moderate Response Plan for distributions are required (for example, using catchment areas for distributions). The focus will remain on delivering the Standard Response Package or parts of it as required.

Porter Mobilization Mechanism

In a major emergency, access to the camps by vehicle may be limited, and the Ukhiya-Balukhali (Army) Road could become inaccessible for a variety of reasons. Therefore, there may be a need to assist with the transport of goods from trucks on the Cox's Bazar-Teknaf Highway and/or from pre-positioned containers stocked with emergency relief items, to pre-identified Distribution Points within the camp. Therefore, each camp should have a mechanism to mobilize emergency porter assistance to be paid through CfW depending on availability of cash on short notice

Distribution points, access routes, and possible pick-up points for the relief items should be well known to SMS staff & volunteers, who will be expected to escort porters during pick up and drop off of relief items.

⁷ See Cyclone Preparedness plans of FOB's under the Site maintenance and Engineering Project (SMEP)-Oct 2018

High visibility vests and identification tags (including a unique number and the camp name written on it) shall be prepositioned by SMS agencies at a field level.

5. Standard initial emergency package

The standard initial emergency package is the basis for what should be delivered to any family that has had its shelter or belongings destroyed or severely damaged in flooding, land-slides, fire, etc.

Only those elements that are needed should be provided based on assessments.

Shelter/ NFI	WASH	Food
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergency shelter kit (ESK): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 1 x tarp, ○ 1 x bundle of 6mm rope, ○ 2 x floor mats 	Cyclone WASH kit is based upon 2-week supply / HH <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aquatabs (33mg) x 200 • Bathing soap 100g x 5 • Jerry cans (10L) x 2 or Jerry can (10L) x1 and Bucket (10L) x1 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 carton HEB (5kg) equivalent for 100 packets lasting for 1 week

5. WASH

In addition of the distribution of WASH kits, the WASH actors⁸ will focus on the:

- Provision of safe drinking water – through recovery of water supply infrastructure, trucking of water, shock chlorination of tube-wells and mobilization of mobile water treatment units.
- Distribution of hygiene kits and household water treatment or bucket chlorination (2nd phase distribution or needs-based)
- Emergency rehabilitation of damaged sanitation facilities (latrine & bathing chamber)
- Construction of emergency sanitation facilities
- Joint assessment with health sector for AWD outbreaks

6. Protection including Child Protection and GBV

Based on the Protection Working Group plan⁹, the protection response to monsoon major incident will include:

- Community based protection (focusing on community mobilization, information provision and feedback mechanism),
- rapid protection response and assistance to persons with specific needs,
- provision of psychosocial support (including Psychological First Aid),
- protection monitoring,
- tracing of missing persons and family reunification,
- prevention and response to gender-based violence,
- Child protection
 - Activate system for identifying & reunifying separated children,
 - Manage shelter locations (LCCMPs) for children without their parents,
 - Provide Psycho Social Support (PSS)/Psychological First Aid (PFA) to children.

In response to the emergency due to a natural disaster, under the coordination of the Protection Sector and its two Sub-sectors protection partners will:

- Deploy a pool of Protection Emergency Response Units (PERU), trained on identification of protection risks and emergency referral mechanisms, with specialized staff in CP and GBV response
- Child Protection Sub-Sector (CPSS) will deploy a core group of ‘Interagency Child Protection Emergencies Response Teams to responsible for family tracing and renunciation, provide PFA/PSS for children, linked to camp CP focal person, volunteers and CBCPCs.
- Deploy Emergency Protection Officers as part of the Medical Mobile Teams (MMTs).
- Existing community trained volunteers will be engaged as part of the mobile response team.

⁸ See the WASH Sector Emergency Preparedness and Response to ISCG 21042019

⁹ Protection Sector Rohingya Refugee Response Sector Cyclone Preparedness & Response Plan, April 2019.

- Child Protection Sub-Sector will activate Lost Child and Caregivers Meeting points (LCCMPs), as safe spaces for lost children while efforts are being made to trace their parents
- Child Protection Sub-Sector will initiate missing child and family link verification, will be done by the CP mobile team including trained rapid FTR workers: Registration focal points with a mobile database of the Family Counting exercise will support family verification when needed.
- Child protection sub-sector based on needs will coordinate to restoration of child protection facilities such as Multi-Purpose Child and Adolescent Centres, Child Friendly Spaces, Adolescent Friendly Spaces and coordinate with organizations will be responsible for coordinating all rehabilitation of their facilities
- Psychosocial First Aid (PFA) will be provided in coordination with health and MHPSS teams and the Health Sector and existing child protection PSS programmes will be adapted back to the needs of the first phase emergency response to provide PFA for children.

7. Health

Based on the Health Sector plan¹⁰, the health immediate response will be implemented by various stakeholders and notably:

- Community Health Volunteers, first aid volunteers, and DMU's (at camp level)
 - Emergency first responders such as BDRCS, Police, Fire and Rescue teams, RAB, and the Military. It should be noted that the army has Military medical teams and Military has oriented approximately 4,700 community volunteers on information sharing, pottering, and supporting the search and rescue efforts (response will be in support of health sector partners and based on orders from Military HQ).
- Field Hospitals and prioritized 24/7 health facilities (based on functionality and physical structure damage assessment) (list attached). If health facilities are damaged and not functional, services will be provided in form of medical mobile teams (from existing health facilities resources)
- Humanitarian Mobile Medical Teams
- Ukhia and Teknaf Health Complex hospitals will remain operational 24/7. Sadar hospital will be the District referral hospital all the time.

Humanitarian Mobile Medical Teams are composed of Emergency Medical Assistance Teams (EMAT) and facility-based emergency medical teams. Currently there are 5 EMAT teams planned for the 2019 monsoon season and it is planned that one facility, preferably with 24/7 operations, based MMT will be in each camp. These teams can be deployed immediately or within 24-hours depending on the nature of the MMT¹¹.

Health Sector EWARS (Early Warning and Surveillance System) will continue its operations. Operational health facilities and mobile teams will continue reporting to existing EWARS system.

8. Communication with Communities - Post-event actions and messaging

Dissemination of package info & activation of emergency Common Feedback Mechanism (CFM)

- An emergency CFM will be activated – this includes materials on the emergency aid that will be provided within the 72-hour period and a CFM form.
- This contains a form with pictures and support text in Burma and English. This form will be gathered by various Rohingya leadership, volunteers, and civil society members to predominantly capture incidences of:
 - People being denied aid

¹⁰ Protection Sector Rohingya Refugee Response Sector Cyclone Preparedness & Response Plan, April 2019.

¹¹ See Mobile Medical Teams Operational Plan https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/15arDJqaAWsQytT_YjKfxA7QhpleDWtc5?ogsrc=32

- People not receiving aid
- People being asked to pay for aid
- Information will be gathered at camp level and fed into response catchments coordination structures to ensure that all people are reached with emergency assistance.

9. Dead Body Management (DBM)

Volunteers at camp level (BDRCS & DMU, Community) will be informed to take dead bodies to Triage Areas (either functioning health facilities or MMT staging areas) where they will undertake the appropriate dead body certification procedure as per Bangladeshi Law (and subsequent exceptions in case of emergency situations)

III. Engagement with Government on host community/Upazila response liaison

In most circumstances, a major monsoon-related disaster affecting the camps will be unlikely to seriously affect the host community and the Bangladeshi population of the rest of Ukhiya and Teknaf. However, in the event that there is sufficient damage in the host community that there are requests to humanitarian partners for assistance, the following protocol should be applied.

The ISCG Senior Coordinator is the overall humanitarian focal point for Cox’s Bazar District on behalf of the HCTT (the Dhaka based forum of national Cluster Coordinators, chaired by MoDMR, charged with national level natural disaster preparedness and response coordination).

In general, all requests for support from the humanitarian community for support for Bangladeshi communities in Cox’s Bazar should go through the DC to the Senior Coordinator, and then for consideration by the HoSO.

In all cases, the ISCG will be responsible only for coordination in the two Upazilas, Ukhiya and Teknaf, with the exception of St. Martins Island. Any coordination requirements for the northern Upazilas in Cox’s Bazar is to be delivered by the HCTT.

Any events that require activation of the HCTT or development of a national-level humanitarian response plan, will fall under the detailed protocols in the “NOTE ON THE HCTT AND THE ISCG INTERACTIONS IN A NATURAL DISASTER”.

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